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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 This antitrust case arises out of a business 
arrangement in the motion picture industry.  The plaintiff, 
Orson, Inc., the owner of the Roxy Screening Rooms, a movie 
theater, alleged that the defendant, Miramax Film Corporation, a 
film distributor, violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1, and Pennsylvania common law by conspiring with 
another theater to drive the Roxy out of business and by granting 
that other theater exclusive, first-run licenses on Miramax 
films.  Orson also charged that the licenses violated the length-
of-run provision of Pennsylvania's Feature Motion Picture Fair 
Business Practices Law.  73 P.S. § 203-7.  Orson now appeals the 
district court's decision to grant Miramax's motion for summary 
judgment. 
 We hold that Orson failed to present evidence 
sufficient to show that Miramax engaged in an antitrust 
conspiracy or that the licenses were unreasonable restraints of 
trade.  We further hold that the district court erred in 
interpreting 73 P.S. § 203-7's requirement concerning the 
geographic expansion of first-run films.  Thus, we will affirm 
the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to 
Miramax on Orson's antitrust claims.  We will, however, vacate 
3 
the district court's grant of summary judgment to Miramax on 
Orson's state statutory claim and remand for further proceedings. 
I.0 
 In January of 1992, Orson assumed the operations of the 
Roxy, a movie theater located in downtown "Center City" 
Philadelphia.  The Roxy exhibited "art films," as opposed to 
movies that may be characterized as "commercial" or "mainstream," 
on two screens, each with a 130 person seating capacity.  The 
Roxy charged between $3.50 and $5.50 for tickets. 
 The Ritz theaters, consisting of two separate five-
screen facilities, the Ritz Five Theaters and the Ritz at the 
Bourse (collectively, the "Ritz"), also exhibited art films in 
Center City.  The Ritz Five Theater, which opened in 1976 with 
about 1,125 seats, was owned and operated by the Posel 
Corporation; the Ritz at the Bourse, opened in 1990 with 
approximately 710 seats, was owned and operated by the Raysid 
Corporation.  Ramon L. Posel was the President of both 
corporations.  The Ritz's admission prices typically ranged from 
$3.50 to $6.00. 
 In addition to the Roxy and the Ritz, there were six 
other theaters in Center City; four theaters with a total of 20 
                                                           
0
 We begin our analysis by reviewing the evidence 
presented in this case.  In considering a motion for summary 
judgment, a court does not resolve factual disputes or make 
credibility determinations, and must view the facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion.  Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 
F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 
(1993). 
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screens were operated by United Artists and two theaters with two 
screens each were operated by American Multi-Cinema.  
 Miramax, a nationwide distributor of feature-length 
motion pictures, including art films, distributed movies to all 
of the theaters located in Center City and to theaters in the 
greater metropolitan Philadelphia area. 
 In the motion picture industry, film distributors 
license films to theaters for exhibition for a given amount of 
time.  Frequently, the license is exclusive, providing that 
during its duration, the film will not be licensed to other 
exhibitors in a prescribed area.  Such licenses are called 
"clearances."    
 In the usual case, films are licensed for a sum which 
consists of a film rental amount and a house allowance.  Under 
this system, the distributor and the exhibitor agree on a 
separate dollar amount which represents the exhibitor's weekly 
expenses.  The exhibitor retains a percentage of the weekly gross 
from ticket receipts above the house expense allowance; the 
remaining percentage inures to the distributor.  Typically, the 
license provides that the distributor will receive a minimum 
percentage of the exhibiting theater's box office gross.  A film 
distributor's revenues, therefore, depend directly upon a 
theater's capacity to attract the public.  Thus, the decision to 
license a movie to one theater or another is premised in 
considerable measure on a distributor's assessment of a theater's 
grossing ability. 
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 The time a particular exhibitor is licensed to show a 
film is called the "run."  A "first-run" is the first exhibition 
of a film in a given geographic area; "subsequent" runs are 
exhibitions of that film in the area after the first-run has 
expired.  Successive runs of motion pictures are a practical 
necessity in the industry because commonly, there are a limited 
number of prints made of any one film.   
 Between January of 1992, when Orson began operating the 
Roxy, and February of 1994, the close of discovery, Miramax 
licensed about 28 films on a first-run basis and one film on a 
subsequent-run basis to the Ritz.  By comparison, during this 
period, Miramax licensed one film on a first-run basis and 
approximately 14 films on a subsequent-run basis to the Roxy. 
Miramax also granted eight first-run licenses to the theaters in 
Center City operated by either United Artists or American Multi-
Cinema0 and six first-run licenses to theaters in the suburbs of 
Philadelphia. 
 At this same time, a number of other distributors also 
licensed films to the exhibitors in Center City.  From the Roxy's 
opening in January of 1992 until March of 1994, Orson was granted 
about 73 first-run, exclusive licenses by 59 different 
distributors.  According to Orson's President, Max L. Raab, art 
film distributors included, in addition to Miramax, three 
                                                           
0
 As Miramax points out, any theater is equipped to 
exhibit art films and theaters which are not known as "art 
houses" can and do decide to show such films, as well as the more 
commercial fare. 
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"distributors of consequence" -- Sony Pictures Classics, the 
Samuel Goldwyn Company and Tristar Pictures. 
 All of the first-run licenses for films that Miramax 
granted to the Ritz were exclusive; that is, they provided that 
the films would not be licensed to another Center City theater 
while playing there.  The licenses were established quite 
informally.  Typically, Posel of the Ritz telephoned Martin 
Zeidman, Miramax's Senior Executive Vice President and head of 
domestic distribution, to discuss the Ritz's desire for a first-
run license on a particular Miramax film.  Having done business 
with one another for several years, Posel and Zeidman understood 
that the license would be exclusive and include standard terms. 
Once the parties agreed upon an opening date, Zeidman completed a 
"Theatrical Booking Worksheet," which set forth the title of the 
film and the opening date, listed the Ritz Five Theaters or the 
Ritz at the Bourse as the exhibitor, identified Posel as the 
buyer, marked the rental percentage terms, and designated the 
shipping territory as "Phila[delphia]."  A day or two later, the 
booking worksheet was telefaxed from Zeidman's office in Los 
Angeles to Miramax's office in New York, which was responsible 
for shipping Miramax film prints to theaters in time for the 
opening date. 
 On occasion, Orson's film buyer, Jeffrey Fox Jacobs, 
asked Zeidman for a first-run, non-exclusive license on a Miramax 
film, indicating that Orson was prepared to offer Miramax a 
higher percentage of the Roxy's box office receipts and a lower 
7 
house allowance than those negotiated by the Ritz.  Jacobs' 
requests, however, were refused.   
 From time to time, Miramax held trade screenings for 
the movies it distributed in Philadelphia.  Miramax would send a 
notice to exhibitors, inviting them to attend the trade screening 
of a certain film on a certain date.  Most of the notices stated 
that "[w]e expect to avail this film for first run Philadelphia 
on or about [date], for an exclusive or non-exclusive run.  After 
the first run theater or theaters have exhibited the film for 42 
days we will consider offers for subsequent runs."  The notice 
requested that a "written offer" be submitted by interested 
exhibitors by a specified time and day. 
 With respect to some of the clearances that Miramax 
granted the Roxy, the booking worksheet that Zeidman completed 
memorializing the clearance bore a date that was prior in time to 
the date of the trade screening notice that Miramax sent to 
exhibitors.0 
 Fifteen of the films that Miramax licensed to the Ritz 
played there for a period of more than 42 days.  Of these, nine 
expanded to other Philadelphia area theaters outside of Center 
City before the 42 days expired; six, however, ran at the Ritz, 
without expanding to other theaters. 
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 For example, the trade screening notice for "The Crying 
Game" was dated December 1, 1992.  The notice announced that the 
first Philadelphia run would occur on or about December 18, 1992, 
invited Philadelphia exhibitors to a December 8, 1992, screening, 
and requested that written offers be submitted no later than 12 
noon on December 10, 1992.  Zeidman's worksheet, which 
memorialized the clearance given to the Ritz for "The Crying" 
Game, however, had a telefax legend dated November 30, 1992. 
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 According to the parties' briefs, the Roxy closed its 
doors in October of 1994. 
 On or about August 2, 1993, Orson commenced this action 
against Miramax.  On August 19, 1993, Orson filed an amended 
complaint in three counts:  Count I alleged that Miramax violated 
section 1 of the Sherman Act by, inter alia, conspiring with the 
Ritz to exclude the Roxy from the art film market by making the 
Ritz its "exclusive Philadelphia exhibitor for first-run art film 
features" and by granting the Ritz "exclusive first-run rights to 
those of Miramax'[s] films which the Ritz want[ed] to exhibit 
. . . ."
0
  Count II alleged that Miramax violated Pennsylvania's 
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 Orson's amended complaint included allegations of 
additional anticompetitive practices by Miramax.  These 
allegations were abandoned, with the exception of allegations of 
retaliatory conduct on Miramax's part, which Orson subsequently 
pursued by way of a motion for injunctive relief.  See supra, p.  
9.  In its motion, Orson relied on Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, 
Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725, 728 (3d Cir. 1962), an antitrust case 
where we held that a court may grant a preliminary injunction 
when a party engages in conduct calculated to frustrate 
litigation, and alleged that Miramax's refusal to grant the Roxy 
any more licenses, including a license for a subsequent run on 
"Strictly Ballroom" was retaliatory.  The district court denied 
Orson's motion, finding that Miramax's reason for refusing Orson 
a license on "Strictly Ballroom" was not solely retaliatory; that 
Miramax films were not indispensable to Orson's survival; that 
Orson had delayed asking for preliminary relief; that a 
preliminary injunction would, under the circumstances, be 
difficult to administer; that Orson's contention that it would be 
unable to secure witnesses for trial because of other theaters' 
fear of retaliation was speculative; that Orson's alleged harm 
was compensable in money damages; that the preliminary injunction 
would be oppressive to Miramax; that Orson had not shown that it 
was likely to succeed on its antitrust claims; and that Orson's 
request for Miramax films exceeded the status quo.  Orson, Inc. 
v. Miramax Film Corp., 836 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1993).   
 
 In this appeal, Orson has also challenged the district 
court's decision to deny the motion for injunctive relief.  This 
issue, however, is moot, in light both of our decision to uphold 
9 
"common law doctrine against unreasonable restraint of trade"; 
and Count III alleged that Miramax violated section 203-7 of 
Pennsylvania's Feature Motion Picture Fair Business Practices 
Law, 73 P.S. § 203-1 et seq. (the "Pennsylvania Act") by 
"consistently grant[ing] the Ritz licenses for its feature art 
films for exclusive first runs for more than 42 days. . . ."0   
 On October 8, 1993, Orson filed a "Motion for 
Injunctive Relief to Restore the Status Quo during Pendency of 
Litigation."  On November 9, 1993, the district court denied 
Orson's motion, Orson Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 836 F. Supp. 
309 (E.D. Pa. 1993); on January 12, 1994, the court denied 
Orson's motion for reconsideration.     
 On March 22, 1994, Orson filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment on its common law restraint of trade claim and 
its Pennsylvania Act claim.  Miramax filed a motion for summary 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the court's order granting summary judgment to Miramax on Orson's 
antitrust claims and of the Roxy's cessation of operations. 
0
 Section 203-7 of Pennsylvania's Feature Motion Picture 
Fair Business Practices Law, 73 P.S. § 203-1 et seq. (the 
"Pennsylvania Act"), states: 
 
§ 203-7.  Length of run 
 
No license agreement shall be entered into 
between distributor and exhibitor to grant an 
exclusive first run or an exclusive multiple 
first run for more than 42 days without 
provision to expand the run to second run or 
subsequent run theaters within the 
geographical area and license agreements and 
prints of said feature motion picture shall 
be made available by the distributor to those 
subsequent run theaters that would normally 
be served on subsequent run availability.  
 
73 P.S. § 203-7. 
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judgment as to all of Orson's claims on January 4, 1994.  On 
April 5, 1994, Miramax filed a cross-motion for summary judgment 
on two claims which, according to Miramax, were not set forth in 
Orson's complaint, but nonetheless discussed in Orson's summary 
judgment motion, namely, violations of sections 203-4 (bidding) 
and 203-8 (screening procedures) of the Pennsylvania Act.  
 On October 5, 1994, the district court denied Orson's 
motion for partial summary judgment in its entirety.  Orson, Inc. 
v. Miramax Film Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1378, 1390 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 As for Miramax's motion, the district court granted 
summary judgment to Miramax on both Orson's federal and state 
antitrust claims.0  Id.  Characterizing the Miramax-Ritz 
agreement "by which Miramax grant[ed] exclusive licenses to the 
Ritz for the exhibition of its art films" as "clearly a vertical 
agreement between a distributor and an exhibitor," the court 
applied the rule of reason to the "restraint at issue."  Id. at 
1385-86.  Focusing on the competitive effects of the exclusive 
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 On summary judgment, the parties agreed that 
Pennsylvania's common law against unreasonable restraints of 
trade follows federal antitrust law.  Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film 
Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1378, 1381 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  Accordingly, 
the district court treated Orson's federal and antitrust claims 
identically.  Id.  Likewise, in this appeal, Orson briefs only 
the federal antitrust issues.   
 
 Further, since Orson had raised, in the district 
court's view, an issue for summary judgment by arguing in its 
brief in opposition to Miramax's motion that the Miramax-Ritz 
agreement should be declared illegal per se, the court evaluated 
the parties' submissions as though it had before it cross-motions 
for summary judgment as to Orson's entire complaint, even though 
Orson had moved expressly for summary judgment on only its 
Pennsylvania law claims.  Id. at 1382.  Orson does not question 
this aspect of the district court's decision on appeal. 
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licenses, otherwise known in the industry as "clearances," the 
court concluded that the clearances were reasonable: 
[T]his Court holds that the clearances at 
issue here are reasonable.  First while the 
clearances stifle intrabrand competition to a 
small degree--no Miramax art film playing at 
the Ritz can play contemporaneously at the 
Roxy, the clearances serve to stimulate 
competition between art films distributed by 
Miramax and art films originating with other 
distributors.  As a result, art film-goers in 
Center City Philadelphia are offered a wider 
array of selections from which to choose. 
Further, it is apparent that the Ritz and the 
Roxy are in substantial competition.  By 
Orson's own admission, the Ritz and the Roxy 
are the only two art houses in Center City 
Philadelphia.  Thus, if the Ritz and the Roxy 
were to exhibit the same film on the same 
dates, not only would the overall degree of 
choice be reduced, but the Ritz would 
assuredly lose income as a result.  At its 
core, Orson's complaint asks the Court to 
compel Miramax to lease its films to Orson 
for exhibition at the Roxy.  The antitrust 
laws were not enacted to achieve such ends.  
 
Id. at 1386.  
 With regard to Miramax's summary judgment motion on 
Orson's section 203-7 Pennsylvania Act claim, the district court 
concluded that Miramax was not liable for the nine films that 
were expanded to suburban Philadelphia theaters on or before the 
forty-third day of their runs at the Ritz, reasoning that section 
203-7 only required that Miramax expand the films to other 
theaters in the Philadelphia area, not to other theaters located 
within Center City.  Id. at 1387-88.  As to the six films that 
were licensed exclusively to the Ritz without expanding to other 
theaters within 42 days, the court denied Miramax summary 
12 
judgment, concluding that material issues of fact had been raised 
as to the existence and terms of the licenses and as to Orson's 
damages and Miramax's intent.0  Id. at 1388. 
 Finally, agreeing with Miramax that a party may not be 
granted summary judgment on claims that are not set forth in its 
complaint, the court granted Miramax's cross-motion for summary 
judgment.  Id. at 1388-90.  At the same time, however, the court 
granted Orson leave to amend its complaint to add claims under 
sections 203-4 and 203-8 of the Pennsylvania Act.  Id. at 1390. 
 After filing a second amended complaint on October 19, 
1994, which added section 203-4 and section 203-8 Pennsylvania 
Act claims in Counts IV and V respectively, Orson sought 
certification of the district court's October 5, 1994 order 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  The court denied Orson's 
request for certification. 
 Ultimately, based on its rulings on summary judgment 
and the parties' stipulation, the district court issued a final 
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 Section 203-10 of the Pennsylvania Act, which covers 
the actions that an exhibitor may bring for alleged violations of 
the Act, states: 
 
§ 203-10.  Actions against distributors and exhibitors 
 
   Any exhibitor may bring an action against a 
distributor or exhibitor or both in the respective 
courts of common pleas wherein the exhibitor's business 
is located to recover damages sustained by reason of a 
willful and intentional violation of his act and, where 
appropriate, shall be entitled to injunctive relief. 
Such exhibitor, if successful, shall also be awarded 
the costs of the action include, but not limited to, 
reasonable attorneys' fees. 
 
73 P.S. § 203-10. 
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order on May 10, 1995, entering judgment in Miramax's favor on 
Orson's federal and state antitrust claims and on Orson's section 
203-7 claim as to the nine films that Miramax distributed on a 
subsequent-run basis to theaters in the greater metropolitan 
Philadelphia area.  The court's May 10 order also dismissed 
without prejudice Orson's section 203-4 and 203-8 claims and 
Orson's section 203-7 claim with respect to the six Miramax films 
that did not expand to other theaters after showing at the Ritz 
for 42 days. 
 This timely appeal by Orson followed.  It involves the 
district court's decision to grant summary judgment to Miramax on 
Orson's antitrust claims and on Orson's Pennsylvania Act section 
203-7 claim with respect to the nine subsequent-run Miramax films 
that played in Philadelphia theaters located outside of Center 
City on or before the forty-second day of their first-run at the 
Ritz,0 as well as the court's denial of Orson's request for 
preliminary injunctive relief.  We will first address the federal 
antitrust issues this appeal raises, and the state statutory law 
question second. 
II. 
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 Since the district court's May 10, 1995 order was a 
final order, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 gives us appellate jurisdiction 
over this entire case.  Thus, our power of review extends not 
only to that portion of the district court's order which reflects 
its decision to grant summary judgment to Miramax, but to that 
portion of its order which reflects its decision to deny Orson's 
cross-motion for summary judgment as well.  International Union, 
United Mine Workers of America v. Racho Trucking Co., 897 F.2d 
1248, 1252 n.2 (3d Cir. 1990). 
14 
 Summary judgment may present the district court with an 
opportunity to dispose of meritless cases and avoid wasteful 
trials.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). 
This is true even in antitrust cases "`where motive and intent 
play leading roles, proof is largely in the hands of alleged 
conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.'"  Big 
Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 
1362 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993),(quoting 
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 
(1962)). 
 Summary judgment must be granted where no genuine issue 
of material fact exists for resolution at trial and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c).  On summary judgment, the moving party need not 
disprove the opposing party's claim, but does have the burden to 
show the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex, 
477 U.S. at 322-23.  If the movant meets this burden, then the 
opponent may not rest on allegations in pleadings, but must 
counter with specific facts which demonstrate that there exists a 
genuine issue for trial.  Id. at 323.  When the nonmoving party 
will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may meet 
its burden by showing that the nonmoving party has not offered 
evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to its case.  Id. at 322.  We remain mindful that in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must assess the 
material facts in light of the proof required of the plaintiff on 
substantive issues. 
15 
 
III. 
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part 
that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States . . . is declared to be illegal."  15 U.S.C. 
§1.  For a section 1 claim under the Sherman Act, "a plaintiff 
must prove `concerted action,' a collective reference to the 
`contract . . . combination or conspiracy."  Big Apple BMW, 974 
F.2d at 1364 (quoting Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 
445 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978)), cert 
denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993).  A "`unity of purpose or a common 
design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful 
arrangement'" must exist to trigger section 1 liability. 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 
(1984) (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 
781, 810 (1946)).  In addition to the element of concerted 
action, a plaintiff must prove that anticompetitive effects were 
produced within the relevant product and geographic markets; that 
the objects of the conduct pursuant to the concerted action were 
illegal; and that it was injured as a proximate result of the 
conspiracy.  Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-
Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993).   
 Virtually all business agreements restrain trade to 
some extent; section 1, therefore, has been construed to make 
illegal only those contracts that constitute unreasonable 
16 
restraints of trade.  Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. 
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).  Whether a business arrangement 
unreasonably restrains trade is determined by the courts, on a 
case-by-case basis, using a rule of reason which considers all 
relevant factors in examining a defendant's purpose in 
implementing the restraint and the restraint's effect on 
competition.  Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 
U.S. 231, 238 (1918).0  Indeed, the traditional rule of reason 
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 There are certain agreements or practices which 
"because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of 
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable 
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise 
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." 
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
Such "plainly anticompetitive" agreements are "`illegal per se.'" 
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 
679, 692 (1978).  Horizontal boycotts have received illegal per 
se treatment.  Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 
U.S. 207 (1959).  Although Orson contended in the district court 
that Miramax's relationship with the Ritz was illegal per se, and 
occasionally speaks of the relationship as a "boycott," it does 
not contend in this appeal that the per se rule applies. 
 
 In addition to the traditional rule of reason and the 
per se rules, courts sometimes apply what amounts to an 
abbreviated or "quick look" rule of reason analysis.  United 
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993).  This 
abbreviated rule applies where per se condemnation is 
inappropriate, but where a full-blown industry analysis is not 
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of an 
inherently suspect restraint.  Id.  For example, in cases 
involving agreements not to compete in terms of price or output 
among members of professional associations, the Supreme Court did 
not apply a per se analysis, opting instead for an abbreviated 
rule of reason test where "`no elaborate industry analysis [was] 
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an 
agreement.'"  FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 
(1986)(quoting Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692). 
 
 Asserting in its brief that "[t]he restraint's negative 
effect on competition is manifest given the abundance of record 
evidence showing that the Miramax-Ritz boycott of the Roxy ha[d] 
the effect of decreasing output and increasing prices in the 
17 
inquiry has essentially remained unchanged since it was first 
announced by the Supreme Court in Chicago Board of Trade and 
focuses on the competitive significance of the restraint:   
The true test of legality is whether the 
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates 
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or 
whether it is such as may suppress or even 
destroy competition.  To determine that 
question the court must ordinarily consider 
the facts peculiar to the business to which 
the restraint is applied; its condition 
before and after the restraint was imposed; 
the nature of the restraint and its effect, 
actual or probable.  The history of the 
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the 
reason for adopting the particular remedy, 
the purpose or end sought to be attained, are 
all relevant facts. 
 
Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.    
 In rule of reason cases, the plaintiff bears the 
initial burden of showing that the alleged combination or 
agreement produced adverse, anticompetitive effects within the 
relevant product and geographic markets.  Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 
668.  The plaintiff may satisfy this burden by proving the 
existence of actual anticompetitive effects, such as reduction of 
output, increase in price, or deterioration in quality of goods 
and services.  Id.  Due to the difficulty of isolating the market 
effects of the challenged conduct, however, such proof is often 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Center City art-film market," Orson suggests that an abbreviated 
rule of reason market analysis should be used here.  Orson 
failed, however, to substantiate its assertion with facts.  We 
have stated that arguments made in legal memoranda are not 
evidence.  Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 
772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 
1013 (1986).  We, therefore, need not consider Orson's suggestion 
further. 
18 
impossible to make.  Id.  Accordingly, the courts allow proof of 
the defendant's "market power" instead.  Id.  Market power -- the 
ability to raise prices above those that would prevail in a 
competitive market -- is essentially a "`surrogate for 
detrimental effects.'"  Id. at 668-69 (quoting FTC v. Indiana 
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986)). 
 If a plaintiff meets his initial burden of adducing 
adequate evidence of market power or actual anticompetitive 
effects, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the 
challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive 
objective.  Id. at 669.  To rebut, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the 
stated objective.  Id. 
 Agreements between entities at different market levels 
are termed "vertical restraints."  See United States v. Topco 
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).  The Supreme Court has 
instructed that vertical restraints of trade, which do not 
present an express or implied agreement to set resale prices, are 
evaluated under the rule of reason.  Business Elec. Corp., 485 
U.S. at 724; see also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 The Supreme Court has also repeatedly confirmed in 
vertical restraint cases that interbrand competition, as opposed 
to intrabrand competition, is the primary goal of the antitrust 
laws.  Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722-23 
(3d Cir. 1991) (citing Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, and 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), and 
19 
GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 36), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1221 
(1992).0 
IV. 
          We now address the antitrust issues raised by the 
business arrangement in this case.  We note at this point that 
Miramax conceded for purposes of summary judgment that the 
relevant product market was art films and that the relevant 
                                                           
0
 In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 
U.S. 36 (1977), a television manufacturer entered into franchise 
agreements which prohibited the sale of its products from other 
than specified locations.  Discussing the application of the rule 
of reason to vertical restraints, the Supreme Court explained the 
difference between interbrand and intrabrand competition: 
 
 Interbrand competition is the 
competition among the manufacturers of the 
same generic product -- television sets in 
this case -- and is the primary concern of 
antitrust law.  The extreme example of a 
deficiency of interbrand competition is 
monopoly, where there is only one 
manufacturer.  In contrast, intrabrand 
competition is the competition between the 
distributors -- wholesale or retail -- of the 
product of a particular manufacturer.   
 The degree of intrabrand competition is 
wholly independent of the level of interbrand 
competition confronting the manufacturer. 
Thus, there may be fierce intrabrand 
competition among the distributors of a 
product produced by a monopolist and no 
intrabrand competition among the distributors 
of a product produced by a firm in a highly 
competitive industry.  But when interbrand 
competition exists, as it does among 
television manufacturers, it provides a 
significant check on the exploitation of 
intrabrand market power because of the 
ability of consumers to substitute a 
different brand of the same product. 
 
Id. at 52 n.19. 
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geographic market was Center City, Philadelphia.  Our evaluation 
of Orson's antitrust claim, therefore, proceeds on this basis.   
 The first issue we consider is the precise nature of 
the agreement between Miramax and the Ritz.  Orson alleges in its 
second amended complaint that Miramax committed to make the Ritz 
its "exclusive Philadelphia exhibitor for first-run art film 
features. . . ."  Based on our careful review of the evidence, we 
disagree.  The record is devoid of any proof of a promise on 
Miramax's part that it would grant first-run licenses on its 
films in Center City to the Ritz only.  Moreover, the evidence is 
to the contrary; the Roxy received a first-run license from 
Miramax, as did the theaters operated in Center City by United 
Artists and American Multi-Cinema.  The record shows, instead, a 
series of clearances granted by Miramax to the Ritz, based on an 
understanding between the parties' respective principals that any 
time the Ritz was showing a first-run Miramax film, its license 
would be exclusive. 
          Before we consider the antitrust significance of the 
clearances, however, we will address the alleged conspiracy that 
we believe lies at the heart of Orson's second amended complaint. 
As we understand it, Orson's antitrust theory does not primarily 
challenge the clearances themselves; but rather, claims that the 
clearances were mere vehicles that Miramax and the Ritz used to 
further a secret conspiracy to drive the Roxy out of business by 
denying that theater first-run Miramax films. 
A. 
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 Our evaluation of Orson's allegations concerning a 
scheme on the part of Miramax and the Ritz to destroy the Roxy is 
controlled by our decision in Houser v. Fox Theaters Management 
Corp., 845 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1988).  There the owners of the 
Colonial Theater (the "Housers") brought an antitrust action 
against several motion picture distributors and the owners of the 
Fox Theaters ("Fox"), alleging, inter alia, that each of the 
distributor defendants violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by 
conspiring individually with Fox to deny the Colonial first-run 
films.  Id. at 1229.  To support this claim, we required the 
Housers to present "direct or circumstantial evidence that 
reasonably tend[ed] to prove the alleged conspirators `had a 
conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an 
unlawful objective.'"  Id. at 1232 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. 
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).  We further 
instructed that in doing so, the Housers had to show "'(1) that 
the defendants acted in contradiction of their economic 
interests, and (2) that the defendants had a motive to enter into 
an agreement.'"  Id. (quoting Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
 As to our first enumerated element, the Housers 
asserted that the distributors had acted against their economic 
interests by consistently choosing to license films to the Fox 
Theaters rather than the Colonial.  They argued that "`[o]n a 
purely objective basis, the Colonial was a better theater than 
any of the five Fox theaters'" in view of its "large seating 
capacity, elegant and well-maintained condition, and its location 
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in a nice section of downtown in contrast to the alleged `dark 
and dingy' quality of the narrow suburban twin theaters and the 
downtown theater owned by Fox."  Id. at 1232.  Despite the 
Housers' assertion, we held that there was not sufficient 
evidence of record to permit a factfinder to conclude that the 
distributor defendants had acted contrary to their economic 
interests; we affirmed the order of the district court granting 
the defendants summary judgment.  Id. at 1233.  We observed that 
"the decision to license a picture to one theater rather than 
another is based on a complicated subjective estimation of a 
theater's grossing potential" and that the courts have recognized 
that "motion picture distributors have broad discretion to make 
licensing decisions based on their own independent judgments." 
Id. at 1232.  Pointing out that the Housers' argument failed for 
emphasizing just a few of the factors that a distributor 
considers in making its licensing decision while ignoring others, 
we stated that "[s]uch factors as a proven track record of high 
box office receipts and an unblemished payment history are as 
important as the seating capacity or aesthetic qualities of a 
theater when estimating its grossing potential."  Id. at 1232. We 
also concluded that the Housers did not substantiate their 
allegations that the distributors conspired with Fox because they 
feared that Fox would use its "circuit power" and refuse to do 
business with them.  Id. at 1233.  We, therefore, further held 
that even if the distributors had acted contrary to their 
economic interests, the Housers failed to present evidence to 
support the second essential element we had articulated, namely, 
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that the distributors were motivated to conspire individually 
with Fox.  Id.   
 Orson makes similar assertions here.  It contends that 
given its willingness to pay a higher percentage of the Roxy's 
gross for first-run Miramax films than paid by the Ritz, Miramax 
acted contrary to its economic well-being by choosing to grant 
clearances to the Ritz; it further maintains that Miramax was 
coerced into favoring the Ritz because the Ritz had made it clear 
that unless it was granted an exclusive arrangement it would use 
its clout and refuse to play Miramax films.     
 We do not find sufficient evidence in the record for 
either assertion.  To the contrary, the evidence establishes that 
the clearances were consistent with Miramax's business interests, 
granted by the distributor to, as between the Roxy and the Ritz, 
the theater it reasonably predicted would generate greater 
income.  The record demonstrated that the Ritz had ten screens at 
two locations with seating capacities of 1,125 and 710 
respectively, while the Roxy had two screens with a seating 
capacity of 130 each.  The Ritz had a solid history of box office 
receipts; by comparison, the Roxy was not nearly as profitable. 
The theaters which comprised the Ritz had been in continuous 
operation since their inception; the Roxy, on the other hand, had 
ceased operations from time to time over the years.  The Ritz 
marketed the films it exhibited and was known to have outstanding 
sound and projection equipment.  Simply put, "[i]n light of the 
broad discretion that must be given to film distributors in 
making complex licensing decisions," id. at 1233, Orson's 
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position, premised solely on the financial terms of its offer, is 
insufficient to call into question the wisdom of Miramax's 
decision.  We, therefore, hold that the evidence in the record is 
insufficient to permit the factfinder to conclude that Miramax 
acted contrary to its self-interest by choosing to license 
exclusively to the Ritz rather than the Roxy.   
 Moreover, the deposition testimony that Orson offered 
to support its assertion that the Ritz had unduly pressured 
Miramax in its licensing decisions, even when viewed in Orson's 
favor, shows nothing of the kind.  The testimony of Raymond Posel 
and Martin Zeidman demonstrates only that there existed a mutual 
understanding between the representatives of Miramax and the Ritz 
that the Ritz first-run licenses on Miramax films would be 
exclusive.  Thus, we also conclude that Orson failed to show that 
Miramax had a motive to conspire with the Ritz to drive the Roxy 
out of business.  
 Lastly, we observe that Orson expended considerable 
effort describing the "trade screening charade" and the "sham 
bidding" in which Miramax and the Ritz allegedly engaged, 
contending that these practices were perpetuated by the parties 
to conceal their unlawful scheme.  We have concluded, however, 
that Orson failed to present sufficient evidence to show that 
Miramax and the Ritz conspired to drive the Roxy from the market; 
we need not, therefore, consider Orson's allegations of a cover-
up on their part.  Further, Orson's assertions about improper 
bidding, without more, lack antitrust significance in this case. 
As we recognized in Sitkin Smelting & Refining Co. v. FMC Corp., 
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575 F.2d 440 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978), "`the 
Sherman Act is neither a lowest-responsible-bidder statute nor a 
panacea for all business affronts which seem to fit nowhere 
else.'"  Id. at 448 (citation omitted).0  
          Therefore, we conclude that Orson failed to sustain its 
burden on summary judgment regarding the essential elements of 
its antitrust conspiracy claim. 
 
B. 
 Our inquiry does not end here.  The fact remains that 
clearances existed between Miramax and the Ritz, and that Orson 
contends that they violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.  
          We begin our analysis of this aspect of Orson's case 
with a general discussion of clearances.  We first observe that 
clearances, which involve entities at different levels of the 
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 We do not suggest that allegations concerning the 
bidding process lack antitrust significance in all contexts.  For 
example, in Movie 1 & 2 v. United Artists Communications, 909 
F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 (1991) and 
502 U.S. 1039 (1992), the plaintiff, a movie theater, alleged 
that two competing motion picture exhibitors and 19 national film 
exhibitors participated in an illegal "split agreement" in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  In the motion picture 
industry, a split agreement is "an exhibitor agreement which 
divides a normally competitive market by allocating films to 
particular members for licensing rights to the films assigned." 
Id. at 1248.  On summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted 
evidence which indicated that the distributor-defendants refused 
to receive any bids from the plaintiff for first-run films, that 
the exhibitor-defendants did not bid against one another and that 
the exhibitor-defendants earned respectively about 96.9% and 
69.9% of all revenues in the relevant market.  Id. at 1251. Under 
these circumstances, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that the plaintiff presented a triable issue on its Section 
1 claim of a conspiracy to restrain trade in the form of a group 
boycott through split agreements.  Id. at 1252. 
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film distribution industry, are vertical, nonprice restraints of 
trade.  See Theee Movies of Tarzana v. Pacific Theatres, Inc., 
828 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 
(1988); see also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 
U.S. 131 (1948).  As such, they are subject under section 1 to a 
rule of reason analysis.  Three Movies of Tarzana, 828 F.2d at 
1399. 
 Clearances have undergone antitrust scrutiny.  Some 
time ago, in Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, the Supreme Court 
reviewed a district court decree which resolved an antitrust 
action brought by the Department of Justice against several 
producers, distributors and exhibitors of motion pictures for 
various Sherman Act violations, including the maintenance of a 
system of allegedly unlawful clearances.  Affirming the district 
court's decision to enjoin the defendants from continuing their 
clearance practices, the Court approvingly referenced the 
district court's view that clearances are justified by "the 
assurance they give the exhibitor that the distributor will not 
license a competitor to show the film either at the same time or 
so soon thereafter that the exhibitor's expected income from the 
run will be greatly diminished," as well as the court's 
conclusion that reasonable clearances require that the theaters 
involved substantially compete.  Id. at 144-47.0 
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 The clearances at issue in United States v. Paramount 
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), involved, inter alia, five major 
defendants which produced motion pictures and their respective 
subsidiaries or affiliates which distributed and exhibited films. 
The evidence showed that the clearances were not typical, bearing 
no relation to the competitive factors which usually justify 
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 More recently, in Theee Movies of Tarzana, 828 F.2d 
1395, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered 
whether certain clearances were reasonable restraints of trade 
under the circumstances presented.  There the owner of a movie 
theater ("TMT") brought suit against a competing exhibitor 
("Pacific") and several movie distributors, alleging that first-
run clearances granted to Pacific's Galleria Theater by the 
distributors violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The district 
court granted summary judgment to the defendants; the court of 
appeals affirmed, noting that the courts have acknowledged over 
the years that "`the whole system of runs and clearances . . . 
purposely, and legitimately, discriminates between competing 
exhibitors.'"  Id. at 1399 (citations omitted).  After initially 
observing that the reasonableness of a particular restraint 
depends upon an understanding of the industry at issue and a 
balancing of the restraint's positive and negative effects on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
them.  Id. at 146.  By way of illustration, the Court set forth 
the following finding of the district court: 
 
"Some licenses granted clearance to sell to 
all theatres which the exhibitor party to the 
contract might thereafter own, lease, 
control, manage, or operate against all 
theatres in the immediate vicinity of the 
exhibitor's theatre thereafter erected or 
opened.  The purpose of this type of 
clearance agreements was to fix the run and 
clearance status of any theatre thereafter 
opened not on the basis of its appointments, 
size, location, and other competitive 
features normally entering into such 
determination, but rather upon the sole basis 
of whether it were operated by the exhibitor 
party to the agreement." 
 
Id. at n.7. 
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competition, the court of appeals concluded that although the 
clearances the Galleria received reduced intrabrand competition 
to a minor degree, they "also encouraged interbrand competition 
by forcing TMT to find alternative subrun movies to exhibit and 
to promote."  Id. at 1399.  Considering next the relationship 
between the Galleria and TMT, the court determined that in view 
of the fact that the theaters competed, the clearances reflected 
a reasonable business decision on both sides of the transaction: 
 Because the two theaters were in 
substantial competition, Pacific [the 
exhibitor] was properly concerned that 
exhibiting first runs at TMT's theater 
simultaneously with the Galleria would 
diminish the Galleria's income.  Pacific 
wanted to recoup its investment in the 
Galleria and advertising, rather than allow 
TMT's theater to "free ride" on its 
advertising.   
 
 The distributors had a legitimate 
business interest in the revenue generated by 
the theaters they licensed, because the 
distributors were paid, in part, out of each 
movie's gross profits.  The distributors 
wished to reach the largest number of viewers 
with the smallest number of movie prints, to 
recoup quickly their own investment.   
 
Id. at 1399-40 (citations omitted). 
 Guided by applicable rules of federal antitrust law and 
the cases we have reviewed, we conclude that the reasonableness 
of a clearance under section 1 of the Sherman Act depends on the 
competitive stance of the theaters involved and the clearance's 
effect on competition, especially the interbrand competition 
which, as the Supreme Court has instructed, is our primary 
concern in an antitrust action. 
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 Applying these criteria to the clearances before us, we 
begin with the fact that the parties agreed that the Roxy and the 
Ritz were in competition.  Thus, the clearances served their 
accepted purpose of assuring both Miramax and the Ritz that the 
return from one run of a particular Miramax film would not be 
diminished. 
 Turning to the touchstone of the rule of reason, the 
clearances' competitive effects, the uncontroverted facts of 
record reveal a market in which competition thrived at both the 
distributor and exhibitor levels.  In Center City, the Roxy, the 
Ritz, and the theaters owned by United Artists and American 
Multi-Cinema vied for the films of at least 59 distributors. 
Indeed, it is the indisputable existence of alternative sources 
of supply for the Roxy which negates the existence of 
anticompetitive effects in this case.  Although the Miramax-Ritz 
clearances most certainly reduced intrabrand competition to some 
degree by disallowing the Roxy from showing on a first-run basis 
any Miramax film that the Ritz had selected, they undeniably 
promoted interbrand competition by requiring the Roxy to seek out 
and exhibit the films of other distributors, which it 
consistently accomplished.  Thus, in our view, the record 
conclusively establishes that the clearances did not produce the 
anticompetitive effects the Sherman Act was designed to prevent. 
On the contrary, competition in the relevant market was enhanced; 
art film consumers in Center City had more movies from which to 
choose.  In an apparent attempt to avoid this absence of proof on 
an essential element of its case, Orson alluded in its brief to 
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Miramax's having market power, arguing that the distributor had 
"enormous financial clout" and "solidified its leading position 
among independent film distributors" subsequent to its 
acquisition by the Walt Disney Company in 1993.  Orson did not, 
however, present a factual basis for this belief.  As we have 
stated, "[l]egal memoranda and oral argument are not evidence and 
cannot by themselves create a factual dispute sufficient to 
defeat a summary judgment motion."  Jersey Cent. Power & Light 
Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986).0 
 We thus conclude that Orson failed to present 
sufficient evidence to support its claim that the Miramax-Ritz 
clearances were unreasonable restraints of trade.      
     
V. 
 We turn now to Orson's state law claim brought under 
section 203-7 of the Pennsylvania Act.  Orson alleges that 
Miramax violated 73 P.S. § 203-7 when it expanded the runs of 
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 Miramax contends that Orson also failed to show that it 
suffered antitrust injury.  Since Orson did not meet its burden 
of presenting sufficient evidence to demonstrate that competition 
was suppressed, we need not address this issue. 
 
 We also note that Orson did not allege nor did it 
present evidence to show that Miramax was a monopolist or that 
only Miramax films constituted the relevant product market.  See 
Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 723 (3d Cir. 
1991) ("[I]t is also true that a well-defined submarket may 
constitute a relevant product market and so under certain 
circumstances a relevant product market could consist of one 
brand of a product, placing intrabrand competition at issue."), 
cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1221 (1992).   We make these points 
because Orson's antitrust theory frequently seemed premised on an 
analysis of a market which was limited to Miramax's product. 
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nine films that had played exclusively at the Ritz for 42 days or 
less to theaters located in the suburbs of Philadelphia, but not 
to other Center City theaters.   
 Section 203-7 provides in pertinent part that "[n]o 
license agreement shall be entered into between distributor and 
exhibitor to grant an exclusive first run or an exclusive 
multiple first run for more than 42 days without provision to 
expand the run to second run or subsequent run theaters within 
the geographical area . . . ."  73 P.S. § 203-7 (emphasis added). 
 On summary judgment, Miramax argued that it complied 
with section 203-7 because the relevant "geographical area" as 
contemplated by section 203-7 was the greater Philadelphia 
metropolitan area; Orson, by contrast, contended that the 
expansions to suburban theaters were legally irrelevant because 
section 203-7 required that Miramax expand the run of each film 
it licensed exclusively to the Ritz to theaters located within 
the geographical area covered by the license, namely, Center 
City.0 
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 Believing that Orson is "apparently contending that 
[s]ection 203-7 compels distributors to terminate a first run at 
one theater, such as the Ritz, after 42 days and open another run 
at a competing theater, such as the Roxy," Miramax argues that, 
if interpreted this way, the Pennsylvania Act would be preempted 
by the Federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914.  Orson, 
however, states in its reply brief that it does not maintain that 
section 203-7 compels distributors to terminate a first run at 
one theater and appears to argue that section 203-7 would only 
require that another theater in the relevant geographic area be 
permitted to share in the run after 42 days.  In the trade, a 
first-run "day and date" refers to the first-run exhibition of a 
film by two theaters at the same time.  Theatre Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 539 n.7 
(1954). 
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 The district court found section 203-7's wording 
"sufficiently vague" to permit these alternative interpretations. 
Orson Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1378, 1387 (E.D. 
Pa. 1994).  Noting that one of the purposes of the Pennsylvania 
Act is to "`promote the wide geographical dissemination at 
reasonable prices to the public of ideas, opinions and artistic 
expression in feature motion pictures,'" 73 P.S. § 203-2(4), and 
that another identified purpose of the Act is to "`foster 
vigorous and healthy competition'" in the film business, id. 
§203-2(3), the court agreed with Miramax and held that since the 
Pennsylvania legislature's "primary purpose in enacting section 
203-7 was not to increase market rivalry among direct 
competitors, but instead to promote the wide distribution of 
movies throughout Pennsylvania[,] . . . Miramax can incur no 203-
7 liability for the 9 films that were expanded to other 
Philadelphia area theaters on or before the forty-third day of 
their runs at the Ritz."  Id. (footnote omitted). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 At any rate, we have already rejected a facial 
challenge to section 203-7 under the Copyright Act, holding that 
"the Act on its face contains no threat to the copyrights 
themselves . . . ."  Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. 
Thornburgh, 683 F.2d 808, 816 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 480 
U.S. 933 (1987).  See Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. 
Thornburgh, 800 F.2d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 
U.S. 933 (1987) ("There may be merit to the distributors' 
argument that the 42-day provision, when construed as limiting 
the distributors' right to license an exclusive run to 42 days, 
is preempted by the Copyright Act.  However, such preemption 
would be apparent on the face of the statute and cannot be 
reconciled with [our] earlier decision [in Associated Films, 683 
F.2d at 816] that the Act is not facially invalid under the 
Copyright Act.").  
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 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not interpreted 
section 203-7.  We, therefore, must predict how the Court would 
interpret and apply that section.  Borman v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 
960 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1992).  Unfortunately, there are no 
intermediate appellate court decisions to assist us.0 
 Pennsylvania abides by well-known rules of statutory 
construction.  When construing a statute, the Pennsylvania courts 
must ascertain and effectuate the Pennsylvania Legislature's 
intent.  1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1921(a); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 
444 Pa. Super. 206, 663 A.2d 746, 748 (1995).  The courts' 
"starting point is the language therein, absent any evidence to 
the contrary.  A statute's plain meaning must prevail." Retenauer 
v. Flaherty, 164 Pa. Commw. 182, 191, 642 A.2d 587, 591 (1994); 1 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1921(a).  Any word or phrase, not 
otherwise defined, must be construed according to the rules of 
grammar and according to the common and approved usage.  1 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1903(a); Martin Media v. Commonwealth, ___ Pa. 
Commw. ___, 661 A.2d 479, 481 n.2 (1995).  Further, the letter of 
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 When a federal district court exercises diversity 
jurisdiction, it must apply the substantive law as decided by the 
highest court of the state whose law governs the action.  See 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Commercial 
Union Ins. Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 851 F.2d 98, 100 (3d 
Cir. 1988).  When the state's highest court has not addressed the 
precise question presented, a federal court must predict how the 
state's highest court would resolve the issue.  Borman v. Raymark 
Indus., Inc., 960 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1992).  Although not 
dispositive, decisions of state intermediate appellate courts 
should be accorded significant weight in the absence of an 
indication that the highest state court would rule otherwise. See 
Rolick v. Collins Pine Co., 925 F.2d 661, 664 (3d Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 973 (1993).  Our review of the district 
court's prediction and application of state law is plenary. Borse 
v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1992).   
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the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of 
pursuing its spirit, 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1921(b), and the 
courts may not insert language into a statutory provision where 
the legislature has failed to supply it.  Key Savings and Loan 
Ass'n v. Louis John, Inc., 379 Pa. Super. 226, 232, 549 A.2d 988, 
991 (1988).  The courts should give effect to all sections of an 
act rather than interpreting the language in such a way that one 
clause is rendered superfluous or meaningless for the benefit of 
another.  1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1921(a); Key Savings and Loan 
Ass'n, 379 Pa. Super. at 232, 549 A.2d at 991.  Finally, when a 
word or phrase is ambiguous, the courts must look beyond the 
statutory language and attempt to ascertain the intention of the 
legislature by reference to various statutory factors, including 
the occasion and necessity for the statute, the circumstances of 
its enactment; the mischief it remedies; the object it seeks to 
attain; former law; the consequences of a particular 
interpretation; contemporaneous legislative history; and 
legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute.  1 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1921(c). 
 With these principles in mind, we conclude that the 
district court's interpretation of section 203-7 is erroneous. 
Although section 203-7 may be less than clear in certain 
respects, it is not ambiguous as to where an exclusive first-run 
license must provide for expansion.  We believe that as a matter 
of simple semantics, the statute's "within the geographical 
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area"0 phrase can only refer to the place where the license was 
granted in the first place.  In our view, when the district court 
interpreted section 203-7 to sanction expansion to theaters 
outside of Center City, the plain meaning of the statute's 
language was distorted since the word "within" in that phrase was 
ignored.  Moreover, in referring to the Act's expressed purposes 
to support its interpretation, the court overlooked the purpose 
which reflects the Pennsylvania Legislature's intention to limit, 
as Orson argues, the length of first-run licenses in the very 
areas they cover: 
[to] benefit the movie going public by 
limiting the long and extensive first runs so 
that additional theaters, in a given area, 
may also exhibit the same feature motion 
picture and at possibly a lower admission 
price . . . . 
 
73 P.S. § 203-2(9). 
 
 We therefore conclude that section 203-7 prohibits a 
distributor and exhibitor from entering into a license agreement 
which grants an exclusive first-run for more than 42 days without 
providing for expansion in the same geographic area covered by 
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 We note that the Pennsylvania Act does not define 
"geographical area".  The Act, however, defines "Run" in section 
203-3 as "[t]he continuous exhibition of a feature motion picture 
in a defined geographical area for a specified period of time." 
73 P.S. § 203-3 (emphasis added).  Section 203-7, unlike section 
203-3, does not have the word "defined" before "geographical 
area."  This omission does not change our analysis, even though a 
Pennsylvania rule of statutory construction provides that "where 
a section of a statute contains a given word, the omission of 
such word from a similar section of the statute shows a different 
legislative intent."  Commonwealth v. Berryman, 437 Pa. Super. 
258, 267, 649 A.2d 961, 965 (1994).  This single rule cannot 
overcome what we see as the plain meaning of section 203-7 and 
the Pennsylvania Legislature's intent in enacting it. 
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the license.  Because the record is either disputed or incomplete 
in critical respects, however, we cannot resolve Orson's section 
203-7 claim on summary judgment.  Further proceedings are 
necessary to resolve, for example, the length of run and 
expansion terms, if any, of the licenses; the availability of 
license agreements and film prints, if relevant, to subsequent 
run theaters; Orson's damages; and Miramax's intent.  See 73 P.S. 
§§ 203-7, 203-10. 
 Thus, we conclude that Miramax was not entitled to 
summary judgment on Orson's section 203-7 Pennsylvania Act claim. 
VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment on Counts I and II of the 
second amended complaint in Miramax's favor.  We will vacate the 
district court's order granting summary judgment to Miramax on 
Count III as to the nine films that expanded to Philadelphia 
theaters outside of Center City on or before the forty-second day 
of their runs at the Ritz and remand for further proceedings on 
Orson's claim that Miramax's actions as to these nine films 
violated section 203-7 of the Pennsylvania Act.0 
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 Each party is entitled to the costs it incurred on 
those claims on which it prevailed on appeal.  The parties shall 
notify the Clerk's Office if they are unable to resolve this 
division of costs between themselves. 
